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 The new law school at the University of California, Irvine is attempting to 
implement an innovative vision of top-tier legal education that focuses upon 
preparing students for the practice of law, and which emphasizes skills-based and 
experiential training.  As part of that effort the school has restructured the 
traditional first-year law school curriculum so that several of the courses each 
focus on particular analytical methods, specifically common law analysis, statutory 
analysis, procedural analysis, constitutional analysis, and international legal 
analysis, rather than on a particular subject matter such as contracts, torts, etc.  
While there are some advantages to this new approach, I discuss in this brief article 
my concerns regarding whether this approach will be as effective in teaching first-
year students basic contract law as would be a more traditional approach that 
attempts to simultaneously expose students to both the common law and statutory 






 In a recent article the Dean of the new University of California, Irvine 
School of Law, Erwin Chemerinsky, discusses in a comprehensive and candid 
manner the recent founding of that law school and his vision for better 
incorporating skills training into top-tier legal education.
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  It is an ambitious 
project, and one certainly wishes Dean Chemerinsky and the other UC-Irvine 
founding faculty that are obviously strongly committed to this new vision of legal 
education the best in their endeavors.  There are of course real questions whether 
such an effort at providing a truly distinctive form of legal education to top-flight 
students will survive the inevitable ebbing of the initial burst of enthusiasm that 
gave rise to the effort.  There are also questions whether the new program will be 
able to successfully resist the financial pressures stemming from the increasingly 
stringent California state educational funding constraints that will probably make it 
impossible to continue to support student scholarship assistance at anywhere near 
the incredibly generous levels that were provided to the initial very small 2009-
2010 and 2010-11 entering classes.
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  Given the relatively high annual tuition and 
fees charged by the UC-Irvine School of Law of over $40,000 year for California 
residents, and over $50,000/year for out-of-state residents,
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 a reduction in the 
availability of scholarship assistance over time may prove to be a significant 




 In this short paper I will not speculate upon the long-term prospects for this 
interesting experiment in legal education, but instead I will offer some concerns 
that I have regarding whether embracing such a skills-oriented focus will actually 
result in better trained lawyers, given the inevitable trade-offs involved.  
Specifically, I want to call into question whether their overall curricular approach 
will be as effective in teaching first-year students basic contract law as is the more 
traditional doctrinal approach that is widely followed elsewhere in legal academia.         
 
 The UC-Irvine first-year curriculum, as described by Dean Chemerinsky, is 
centered around various analytical methods – common law analysis, statutory 
analysis, procedural analysis, constitutional analysis, and international legal 
analysis –  rather than around doctrinal subject areas.4  In their first fall semester 
students take a course titled “Common Law Analysis: Contracts” which as the 
name suggests is “primarily about the common law of contracts.”5 They also take a 
course titled “Statutory Analysis” which focuses on criminal law, and a course 
called “Procedural Analysis” which focuses on civil procedure.6  In the subsequent 
spring semester they take “Common Law Analysis: Torts,” which as the name 
suggests focuses upon tort law, and “Constitutional Analysis,” and “International 
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Legal Analysis.”7  The subsequent upper-level curriculum is largely elective, 
except for a writing requirement and a required clinical experience.
8
  This clinical 
requirement is perhaps their most important skills-oriented innovation.
9
   
 
 My major concern with this new approach is that while UC-Irvine’s first-
year students will likely receive excellent and intensive instruction in both 
common law analysis and statutory analysis, both obviously essential lawyering 
skills, this methods-oriented approach may not provide students with an integrated, 
more holistic approach to any single doctrinal subject that would simultaneously 
expose them to both its common law and statutory aspects, and which would 
emphasize the connections and relationships between the case law and the statutes, 
and thus would arguably better prepare them for the many legal problems that 
require them to know both the relevant statutes and the case law and be able to 
effectively blend both forms of legal analysis. 
 
 My particular field of expertise is contract law, so let me use that area of law 
as an example of my concerns.  I have been teaching a two-semester introductory 
contract law sequence to first-year students at Southern Methodist University’s 
Dedman School of Law for over 20 years.  I teach what might be regarded as a 
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relatively conventional doctrinal course that attempts to blend together both 
common law and statutory principles.  Let me discuss what I fear might be lost by 
the UC-Irvine approach of teaching contract law in a one-semester course that 
focuses primarily upon general principles of common law analysis and only 
secondarily upon contract law doctrine, and then subsequently introduces those 
students to statutory analysis through a course that focuses exclusively upon 
criminal law statutes and not upon contract-related statutes such as the provisions 
of the Uniform Commercial Code.       
  
 I structure my instructional approach around four major areas of contract 
law; contract formation, contract enforcibility defenses, contract interpretation, 
performance and breach, and finally remedies, which topics I present in that order 
over the course of the year.
10
  In my treatment of contract formation law, I start by 
developing in a common law fashion the classical contract formation elements of 
offer, acceptance, mutual assent and consideration, and then present the more 
expansive modern doctrines of promissory estoppel and moral obligation, also in a 
common law fashion.  I do, however, make use of two important statutes contained 
in Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code in presenting this contract formation 
material.  First, I have the students study UCC S. 2-205, which abridges the 
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common law freedom of certain offerors to revoke their offers with regard to 
certain signed offers.  This statute provides a first exposure to the pervasive 
modern statutory abridgement of common law doctrines, as well as a vehicle for 
introducing students to the idea of a civil code, and to the realization that most 
other countries have not embraced the classical Anglo-American freedom of 
offerors to freely revoke their offers.  Second, I have the students study the well-
known UCC S. 2-207 “battle of the forms” provision in some detail, and I explain 
the genesis of that statute in the difficulty that common law courts had in coming 
up with a satisfactory resolution to this problem that meshes with the core “mirror 
image rule” classical acceptance principle, and I also explain how S. 2-207, despite 
its well-known shortcomings, has since its adoption had substantial persuasive 
authority in the case law outside of the sale of goods context.  By being exposed to 
S. 2-207 in their introductory contract law course, which apparently does not take 
place at UC-Irvine,
11
 students are not only obviously better equipped to deal with 
these kinds of sale of goods disputes in practice, but they have also been 
introduced to the complicated interplay between common law rulings and statutes 
in contract law. 
 
 Moving on to enforcibility defenses, the limitations inherent in a common 
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law-focused instructional approach are far more severe.  I am frankly at somewhat 
of a loss to understand how this important area of contract law could be adequately 
taught without reference to statutes, since many of the more important enforcibility 
defenses are primarily or even entirely statutory.  For example, both what are often 
referred to as the “common law” Statutes of Frauds and the UCC Statute of Frauds 
are statutes, after all, not common law principles.  The Statute of Limitations 
defense, which raises important issues about whether to characterize claims as 
contractual or in tort, and (for UCC S. 725) an issue of how best to characterize 
breach of warranty claims, is entirely grounded in state or federal statutes.  The 
modern unconscionability defense, while it has some early common law 
grounding, is largely the outgrowth of courts applying and extending UCC S. 2-
302.  The common law-based fraud and misrepresentation defenses are now very 
often asserted under the more permissive statutory provisions of the federal 
securities laws and SEC rule 10b-5.   There have also been significant federal and 
state statutory limitations imposed on the common law sovereign immunity 
defense, and of course the bankruptcy defense, which is important in practice and 
will often will bar otherwise valid contractual claims, is wholly statutory.  One 
simply has to address certain statutes in some detail to give students an adequate 
understanding of the range of and contours of the contract enforcibility defenses 
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that are potentially available.  
 
 The portion of the contracts course relating to contract interpretation, 
performance and breach is perhaps a bit more amenable to a common law-focused 
approach than are the previously discussed areas of contract law.  However, UCC 
Article 2 in Sections 2-601 and 2-507 substitutes a different “perfect tender 
rule/seller cure rights” framework for the common law material breach analysis, 
and students who may later be involved in sale of goods litigation need to have 
some familiarity with these statutory provisions.  In addition, the common law 
authority regarding the impracticability excuse defense has been largely displaced 
by UCC S. 2-615, which has had significant persuasive authority outside of the 
UCC.   
 
 Finally, as to remedies, a student’s understanding of remedial law is 
certainly incomplete without at least some exposure to the various state and federal 
statutes that displace to a greater or lesser extent the common law rule that parties 
to contract litigation are responsible for their own attorney’s fees.  For example, 
the majority of the graduates of the Dedman School of Law here at Southern 
Methodist University go on to engage in private practice in Texas.  Now Texas has 
  
10 
a broad statute in force that awards attorney’s fees to any person who prevails on a 
contract claim against an “individual or corporation.”12  A student who graduated 
from law school unaware of that statute, or who had heard of it in passing 
reference but was completely unfamiliar with the subsequent complicated case law 
regarding which parties qualified under the statute as an “individual or 
corporation,“ would not really be ready to practice law in Texas. 
 
 I am an economist by training and am therefore well aware of the 
unavoidable trade-offs that are involved in any course of action.  The major trade-
off that I see to be inherent in the UC-Irvine analytical methods oriented first-year 
instructional approach is that while the traditional doctrinal subject matter 
organization of the law school curriculum arguably does not adequately feature the 
several different analytical methods that one must master to practice effectively in 
any field of law, moving to their analytical methods orientation in first-year legal 
education so as to remedy this problem appears to me to disrupt the holistic 
blending of common law and statutory themes that can be achieved in a well-
taught doctrinal course.   
 
 Dean Chemerinsky in his article is obviously emphasizing what is distinct 
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about the UC-Irvine skills-oriented approach to first-year legal instruction.   I am 
sure that whichever faculty will be teaching the new “Common Law Analysis: 
Contracts” classes in coming years will be experienced contract law professors 
who are well aware of the points I am here making, and doubtless they will attempt 
to incorporate statutory references and discussions into the class where this is 
necessary for educational purposes.  But they will clearly be limited in their ability 
to present and explain those statutes, and to have the students spend time working 
with them, by the overarching and explicit common law analysis orientation of the 
class.   Something will have to give here, and it will likely be the time usually 
devoted to statutory analysis in the contracts course.
13
  The UC-Irvine analytical 
methods oriented approach to first-year legal education may ultimately prove to be 
superior to the more traditional doctrinal subject matter approach, all things 
considered, and particularly when it is assessed in the context of the innovative 
second- and third-year education that the school will be attempting to provide, but 
it appears to me that there may be something lost as well as something gained from 
pursuing that first-year approach, at least with regard to contract law instruction.                           
 
____________________________ 
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